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Abstract
Previous envelope theorems establish differentiability of value functions in
convex settings. Our envelope theorem applies to all functions whose deriva-
tives appear in first-order conditions, and in non-convex settings. For ex-
ample, in Stackelberg games, the leader’s first-order condition involves the
derivative of the follower’s policy. Similarly, we differentiate (i) the bor-
rower’s value function and default cut-off policy function in an unsecured
credit economy, (ii) the firm’s value function in a capital adjustment prob-
lem with fixed costs, and (iii) the households’ value functions in insurance
arrangements with indivisible goods. Our theorem accommodates optimiza-
tion problems involving discrete choices, infinite horizon stochastic dynamic
programming, and Inada conditions.
Keywords: First-order conditions, policy functions, discrete choice, Inada conditions,
dynamic programming, reverse calculus.
1 Introduction
A fundamental insight of economics is that optimal choices occur where marginal
benefit equals marginal cost. In simple economies, both sides of this first-order con-
dition are exogenous, and can be assumed to exist. In recursive macroeconomies,
*An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “Envelope Theorems for Non-
Smooth and Non-Concave Optimization.” We are very grateful to Michael Elsby, Philipp Kircher,
Dirk Krueger, Tzuo Hann Law, George Mailath, Jochen Mankart, Steven Matthews, Nirav
Mehta, Guido Menzio, Leonard Mirman, Kurt Mitman, John H. Moore, Georg Nöldeke, An-
drew Postlewaite, Kevin Reffett, Felipe Saffie, József Sákovics, Ilya Segal, Shouyong Shi, Philip
Short, Jonathan Thomas, Xi Weng, Tim Worrall, and Mark Wright for fruitful discussions.
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the marginal benefit of preparing for the future is endogenous, and envelope theo-
rems have established its existence in well-behaved convex settings. However, there
are many important economic problems where it is unknown whether first-order
conditions apply.
Threats to first-order conditions. Jumps can arise in objective functions even
if all of the model primitives are continuous. For example, consider the Stackelberg
duopoly game, which we study in detail in Section 2. The follower’s policy function
appears inside the leader’s objective function. But strong conditions are required
to ensure that the follower’s policy function is continuous. If the follower’s policy
function is discontinuous, then the leader’s objective function is not continuous,
let alone differentiable.
Kinks can arise in objective functions even if all model primitives are differen-
tiable. This occurs when a continuous choice is taken along side a discrete choice.
For example, consider a Stackelberg leader who can build his factory in China
or Europe. Assume each location has a differentiable cost function. Despite this
assumption, the firm’s overall cost function has a kink at the quantity where both
locations are equally costly.
Hidden jumps and kinks arise when the objective is differentiable, but ingredi-
ents such as benefit and cost are not. For example, suppose that the Stackelberg
leader does not know the follower’s cost curve. He assigns probabilities to two
different follower cost curves, and hence to two different leader benefit functions.
Even if the expected benefit of selling output is differentiable, this does not imply
that the ex post benefit curves are differentiable. They might have kinks or jumps
that cancel each other out. In this case, it is impossible to write a meaningful
first-order condition.
Boundary problems arise when decision makers prefer to make boundary choices,
such as exhausting capacity constraints. Since first-order conditions only apply to
interior solutions, economists often steer decision makers to the interior by impos-
ing Inada conditions. This is problematic as the relevant envelope theorems depend
on placing uniform bounds on derivatives. In other words, economists wishing to
apply first-order conditions have an uncomfortable choice between (i) assuming
Inada conditions hold to ensure that all solutions are interior, or (ii) assuming
that Inada conditions do not hold, to ensure that derivatives exist.
These threats are common place in important economic problems. For exam-
ple, all four threats arise in the unsecured credit market model of Arellano (2008),
which we study in Section 5.1.1 First, the borrower’s future default policy appears
in his objective, because it determines default risk and hence interest rate pay-
1 Below, we also discuss related work including Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012).
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ments. There is no a priori reason why his policy would be differentiable. Second,
the borrower has a discrete choice – whether to honour or default on debts owed –
leading to kinks in his value function. Third, even if the objective is differentiable,
the default policy and value function might have jumps or kinks that cancel each
other out. Fourth, Arellano focuses on a utility function that satisfies the Inada
conditions. These four features of Arellano’s model pose difficulties to applying
any of the existing envelope theorems.
Techniques. We devise three new techniques for addressing these threats to
first-order conditions. Our Differentiable Sandwich Lemma synthesises various
sandwich arguments deployed in previous envelope theorems. It establishes that a
function F is differentiable at a point c if it is sandwiched between two differen-
tiable functions U and L, as depicted in Figure 1. Specifically, the lemma applies if
the two functions, which we call differentiable upper and lower support functions,
satisfy (i) U(c) = F (c) = L(c), (ii) U(c)  F (c)  L(c) for all c, and (iii) L and U
are differentiable at c. Our lemma generalises Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979,
Lemma 1) by dropping all convexity requirements.
U(c)
L(c)
c
F (c)
c
(a) F is differentiable at c
U(c)
L(c)
c
F (c)
c
(b) F is differentiable at c
c
c^
F (c)
U(c)
(c) Upper support at a max
Figure 1: Differentiable Sandwich Lemma
The lemma is well-suited to studying optimal choices. Suppose that the decision
maker must make a continuous choice c 2 R followed by a discrete choice d 2
D. Assume that his utility function vd(c) is differentiable in c for each discrete
choice d. Let F (c) = maxd2D vd(c) be the value after choosing c. Notice that at
an optimal choice (c^; d^), the value function is sandwiched between the horizontal
line U(c) = F (c^) and vd^, as depicted in Figure 1c. Therefore, F is differentiable
at c^. Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 2) previously drew this conclusion for
the special case that fvdgd2D is equi-differentiable and has uniformly bounded
derivatives. Their redundant conditions conflict with Inada conditions. This means
that the Differentiable Sandwich Lemma is applicable to problems with discrete
choices and Inada conditions for the first time.
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Our second and most important innovation, Reverse Calculus, is the opposite
of normal calculus. Whereas normal calculus establishes that H(c) = F (c) +G(c)
is differentiable if F and G are differentiable, reverse calculus establishes that F
and G are differentiable if H is differentiable. The main requirement for reverse
calculus is that each ingredient function must have an appropriate differentiable
support function. For example, if H(c) = F (c) + G(c), then we require F and
G have differentiable lower support functions f and g at c, depicted in Figure 2.
Under these conditions, F is sandwiched between f and H   g, and is therefore
differentiable.
= +
c c c
c c c
H = F +G
F
f
H   g
G
g
Figure 2: Reverse calculus: F is differentiable at c.
Reverse calculus addresses problems whose objectives involve policy functions
and/or expectations over a family of value functions. As discussed above, it is
insufficient to establish that the objective function (e.g. H) is differentiable. Mean-
ingful first-order conditions require us to establish that all of the relevant ingredient
functions (e.g. F and G) are differentiable. We develop a reverse calculus for many
standard operations, including addition, multiplication, function composition and
upper envelopes.
Our third innovation addresses a remaining problem: finding an appropriate
differentiable support function for policies. Unlike our previous innovations, it ap-
plies only to optimal stopping rules such as when to default on debt obligations.
Benveniste and Scheinkman’s (1979) proof involved constructing a value func-
tion of a “lazy” decision maker that uses a completely unresponsive policy rule.
Since this lazy decision maker makes weakly inferior choices, his value function
is a lower support function. Moreover, since the unresponsive policy is constant,
the lazy value function merely traces out the shape of the differentiable utility
function. Benveniste and Scheinkman conclude that the lazy value function is a
differentiable lower support function. We apply the same idea to optimal stopping
rules. Specifically, we construct a lazy stopping rule derived from underestimat-
ing the surplus from continuing. Lazy stopping rules terminate prematurely, and
hence provide a differentiable support function.
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Contribution. These techniques are complementary, and allow us to prove the
following theorem: if all ingredient functions of an optimization problem have ap-
propriate differentiable support functions, then at any optimal choice, (i) the objec-
tive is differentiable, and (ii) all of the ingredients are differentiable. This theorem
applies even when there are discrete choices, the primitives involve Inada condi-
tions, and many endogenous ingredient functions are combined in expectations,
budget constraints, or incentive constraints.
This allows us to resolve several open problems. We re-examine three economies
in which previous authors have applied first-order conditions, where the correctness
of these conditions was until now an open question. Specifically, we establish that
first-order conditions do hold (i) in unsecured credit markets with endogenous
default probabilities, (ii) in capital markets with fixed costs of adjustment,2 and
(iii) in informal insurance arrangements with indivisible choices.3
Outline. Section 2 lays out our recipe for deriving first-order conditions using a
Stackelberg duopoly as a running example. Section 3 formally specifies and proves
the lemmas, and combines them into an abstract envelope theorem. It also de-
velops a novel proof of the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) envelope theorem.
In Section 4 we compare our techniques to previous work. In Section 5, we apply
them to the open questions listed above, and Section 6 concludes. The appendix
connects differentiable sandwiches with Fréchet subderivatives.
2 Illustration
This section develops a recipe for deriving first-order conditions through a series
of illustrated examples. The examples are all Stackelberg duopoly games in which
a leader’s first-order condition involves the derivative of a follower’s policy func-
tion. Other related problems are explored by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, Chapter 19). The textbook analysis requires strong
convexity and twice-differentiability assumptions, which we relax by introducing
capacity constraints. The follower’s policy has a kink where he switches from being
constrained to unconstrained. We establish that the leader steers the follower away
from these kinks.
2 Below, we discuss the work of Harrison, Sellke and Taylor (1983), Caballero and Engel
(1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Gertler and Leahy (2008), Khan and Thomas (2008b)
and Elsby and Michaels (2014).
3 Below, we discuss the work of Thomas and Worrall (1988, 1990), Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon,
Thomas and Worrall (2002), Koeppl (2006), Rincón-Zapatero and Santos (2009), and Morten
(2013).
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The first example illustrates how to apply the differentiable sandwich lemma to
obtain first-order conditions when there is only one policy function. In the second
example, there are two policy functions. We apply reverse calculus to establish
that the follower steers the leader away from the kinks in both policy functions.
While reverse calculus applies generally to optimisation problems, the third exam-
ple shows that it generically fails elsewhere.
Textbook Stackelberg Competition. To fix notation, we review the textbook
analysis (e.g. Varian (1992, Section 16.6)) of a Stackelberg duopoly. A leader and a
follower choose their output levels, y1 and y2 sequentially, which costs them C(y1)
and C(y2). The output is sold at the market price, P (y1+ y2). Firm i earns profits
i(y1; y2) = yiP (y1 + y2)  C(yi). The follower chooses y2 = f(y1) by solving
f(y1) = arg max
y2
2(y1; y2) (1)
and the leader chooses the y1 that maximises his objective
1(y1) = 1(y1; f(y1)): (2)
The textbook first-order conditions for the follower and leader are
P (y1 + y2) + P
0(y1 + y2)y2 = C 0(y2) and (3)
P (y1 + f(y1)) + P
0(y1 + f(y1))(1 + f 0(y1))y1 = C 0(y1): (4)
The derivatives of P , f , and C appear in (4). The demand function P and cost
function C are exogenous, so we can assume they are differentiable. However, we
can not assume that the follower chooses a differentiable policy f .
The textbook solution is to assume the cost and demand functions are strictly
convex/concave and twice differentiable. Under these assumptions, (3) implicitly
defines the follower’s policy function, which is differentiable by the implicit func-
tion theorem. Therefore, the leader’s first-order condition (4) holds at her optimal
choices.
Example 1: Stackelberg with Capacity Constraints. Suppose the follower
has a capacity constraint Y . The follower’s cost function is
C(y) =
(
c(y) if y  Y ,
1 if y > Y , (5)
where c() is twice differentiable and strictly convex.
The follower’s best response has an upward kink, depicted in Figure 3a, where
his capacity constraint transitions from binding to non-binding. This translates
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y1
y2
Y
1 5 9
(a) Follower’s policy
y1
1
1 5 9
(b) Leader’s profit
U(y1)
L(y1; y^1)
y1
1
y^1
(c) Differentiable sandwich
Figure 3: Stackelberg with a capacity constrained follower
into a downward kink in the leader’s objective, depicted in Figure 3b. Would the
leader ever choose this kink, thus invalidating the first-order condition (4)?
The answer is no. To prove this, we will construct a differentiable sandwich
around the leader’s objective 1() at the optimal choice y^1. First, we construct the
bottom half of the sandwich. Since the follower’s policy (depicted in Figure 3a) is
the lower envelope of two differentiable functions, it has a differentiable upper sup-
port function F () at y^1. The follower’s policy enters the leader’s objective through
the downward sloping demand curve P . This means that L(y1) = 1(y1; F (y1)) is
a lower support function for the leader’s objective at y^1.
Second, we construct the top half of the sandwich as the constant function
U(y1) = (y^1).
These support functions form a sandwich, illustrated in Figure 3c. By the
differentiable sandwich lemma, the leader’s objective is differentiable at y^1, where
it satisfies the first-order condition
01(y^1) = U
0(y^1) = 0: (6)
However, we have not yet established (4), which is a more useful first-order
condition. In particular, we have not yet determined whether f is differentiable at
y^1. This is a reverse calculus problem: we have established that the left side of (2)
is differentiable, and we would now like to infer that the policy f on the right side
is differentiable. In this example, there is a simple solution. Since (2) implicitly
defines f near y^1, the implicit function theorem implies f is differentiable at y^1.
We conclude that the leader’s first-order condition (4) holds at optimal choices.
This example illustrates how the differentiable sandwich lemma and a simple
form of reverse calculus can be applied to establish first-order conditions. The
main task was constructing the bottom half of the sandwich. We constructed a
differentiable upper support function for the follower’s policy, which we used to
construct a differentiable lower support function for the leader’s objective. Since
there was only one endogenous function, the reverse calculus step only required
the implicit function theorem.
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Example 2: Stochastic Stackelberg with capacity constraints. The pre-
vious example only required a simple reverse calculus step, because there was
only one policy function. We now consider a problem with two policy functions.
We extend Example 1 by assuming that the follower has privately known costs.
Specifically, the leader assigns probabilities pA and pB to the follower’s production
cost being CA() or CB(), respectively. The follower now has two policies fA and
fB, one for each cost function. The leader’s problem is to choose output y1 to
maximise her expected profit
1(y1) =
X
z2fA;Bg
pzy1P (y1 + fz(y1))  C(y1): (7)
We would like to determine whether her first-order conditionX
z2fA;Bg
pz fP (y1 + fz(y1)) + y1P 0(y1 + fz(y1))(1 + f 0z(y1)g   C 0(y1) = 0 (8)
holds at her optimal choice y^1. As before, the follower’s policy functions have one
kink each, depicted in Figure 4a. The corresponding leader objective function (de-
picted in Figure 4b) inherits both kinks, but neither kink is an optimal choice. Does
the leader always steer the follower away from the kinks in his policy functions?
y1
y2
Y
1 5 9
(a) Follower’s policies
y1
1
1 5 9
(b) Leader’s profit
Figure 4: Stackelberg follower with privately known cost
As in the previous example, we can construct a differentiable upper support
function Fz() for each policy fz() at y^1. The same method as before establishes
that the first-order condition 01(y^1) = 0 holds.
We show that the follower’s policy functions fz() are differentiable at y^1. In the
previous example, this was a straightforward application of the implicit function
theorem. However, one equation can not implicitly define two policy functions.
Instead, we apply our reverse calculus summation rule toX
z2fA;Bg
pzy1P (y1 + fz(y1)):
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Since this sum is differentiable, and each term has a differentiable lower support
function Lz(y1) = pzy1P (y1 + Fz(y1)), the rule implies that each term is differen-
tiable at y^1. Therefore, both policy functions are differentiable at optimal choices,
and the first-order condition (8) holds.
When there are two or more policy functions, the implicit function theorem
can not be applied to establish they are differentiable. This example showed how
reverse calculus applies in these situations. In fact, we did not need to impose any
additional conditions. This lead to the following recipe:
(i) Construct a differentiable lower support function for the objective, by finding
appropriate support functions for the ingredients.
(ii) A constant upper support function exists at optimal choices.
(iii) By the differentiable sandwich lemma, the objective’s derivative exists and
is zero.
(iv) By reverse calculus, all derivatives in the first-order condition exist.
Example 3: Stackelberg leader’s value. In the first two examples, we applied
reverse calculus to show that the leader chooses differentiable points of the fol-
lower’s policies. In this example, we illustrate how reverse calculus might fail. We
focus our attention on the follower’s value function,4
V2(y1) = f(y1)P (y1 + f(y1))  C(f(y1)): (9)
It is straightforward to show that V2 is a concave function. Therefore, the Ben-
veniste and Scheinkman (1979) envelope theorem (which we prove in Section 4.1)
implies that V2 is globally differentiable. It is tempting to deduce that the follower’s
policy, f , which appears twice on the right side of (9), must also be globally dif-
ferentiable. However, in Figure 3a, we saw that f is not globally differentiable!
Why does reverse calculus not apply here? The right side of (9) is the difference
between revenue and cost, which have identical kinks that cancel each other out.
This cancellation is depicted in Figure 5. The relevant reverse calculus rule is the
implicit function theorem, because the policy function y2 = f(y1) is implicitly
defined by the equation  (y1; y2)  V2(y1) y2P (y1+y2)+C(y2) = 0: The implicit
function theorem requires that @
@y2
 (y1; y2) be non-zero at (y1; f(y1)). But it is
always zero – this is the follower’s first-order condition for choosing y2.
Kink cancellation is not special to value functions in Stackelberg games. It is
a property of generic concave dynamic programming problems of the form
V (a) = max
a0
u(a; a0) + V (a0) (10)
= u(a; f(a)) + V (f(a)); (11)
4 Value functions of other players arise in problems with promise-keeping constraints.
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(a) Follower’s optimal rev-
enue, f(y1)P (y1 + f(y1))
 
y1
1 5 9
(b) Follower’s optimal cost,
C(f(y1))
=
y1
V2
1 5 9
(c) Follower’s value function
Figure 5: Kinks exactly cancel, endogenously
where u is concave and once (but not twice) differentiable, and f is the policy
function. Again, V is globally once (but not twice) differentiable. Santos (1991)
showed that f is only differentiable where V is twice differentiable. We conclude
that the left side of (11) is differentiable, but that the two terms on the right
side are not; they contain kinks that cancel each other out where V is not twice
differentiable.
This is a cautionary example. When the conditions of reverse calculus are not
met, kinks in ingredient functions might be hidden by kink cancellation. This
occurs in generic concave dynamic programming problems.
3 Envelope Theorem
This section presents the proofs in full generality of the differentiable sandwich
lemma and of reverse calculus.
3.1 Differentiable Sandwich Lemma
Before stating the lemma, we need to be precise about what a derivative is. Since
we would like to accommodate many continuous choices (such as asset portfolio
choices), we use the standard multidimensional definition of differentiability. This
definition ensures that the chain rule and other calculus identities are valid.
Definition 1. A function F : C ! R with domain C  Rn is differentiable at
c 2 int(C) if there is some row vector m with m> 2 Rn such that
lim
c!0
F (c+c)  F (c) mc
kck = 0: (12)
Such an m is the derivative of F at c, and is denoted F 0(c).
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In fact, this definition is almost identical to the case where the domain is a subset
of a Banach space (X; kk), and our results generalize without amendment.5
Lemma 1 (Differentiable Sandwich Lemma). If F is differentiably sandwiched
between L and U at c then F is differentiable at c with F 0(c) = L0(c) = U 0(c).
Proof. The difference function d(c) = U(c)   L(c) is minimized at c. Therefore,
d0(c) = 0 and we conclude L0(c) = U 0(c).
Let m = L0(c) = U 0(c). For all c,
L(c+c)  F (c) mc
kck
 F (c+c)  F (c) mckck 
U(c+c)  F (c) mc
kck : (13)
Consider the limits as c ! 0. Since L0(c) = U 0(c) = m, the limits of the first
and last fractions are 0. By Gauss’ Squeeze Theorem, we conclude that the limit
in the middle is also 0, and hence that F is differentiable at c with F 0(c) = m.
Remark 3.1. The Differentiable Sandwich Lemma also applies when F : C ! R
is sandwiched between L and U on an open neighbourhood of c.
3.2 Maximum Lemma
The Differentiable Sandwich Lemma requires us to construct upper and lower
support functions. One simple construction is a horizontal line (or hyperplane)
through the maximum of a function (see Figure 3c).
Lemma 2 (Maximum Lemma). Let  : C ! R be a function. If c^ 2 int(C)
maximises , then U(c) = (c^) is a differentiable upper support function of .
3.3 Reverse Calculus
Calculus involves rules such as “if F and G are differentiable at c, then H(c) =
F (c) + G(c) is also differentiable at c.” Reverse calculus rules go in the opposite
direction. We provide the most important rules here, and additional rules for con-
vex combinations and endogenous function composition in Appendix B. We also
omit the corresponding rules for subtraction and division, which would involve
both upper and lower support functions.
5 In Banach spaces, the derivative m is called a “Fréchet derivative” and lies in the topologi-
cal dual space X = fm : X ! R such that m is linear and continuousg. For our purposes, it is
unnecessary to define a topology on X because all limits are taken in (X; kk) and R.
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Lemma 3 (Reverse Calculus). Suppose F : C ! R, and G : C ! R have
differentiable lower support functions f , and g respectively at c.
(i) If H(c) = F (c) +G(c) is differentiable at c, then F is differentiable at c.
(ii) If H(c) = F (c)G(c) is differentiable at c and F (c) > 0 and G(c) > 0, then
F is differentiable at c.
(iii) If H(c) = max fF (c); G(c)g is differentiable at c and F (c) = H(c), then F
is differentiable at c.
(iv) If H(c) = J(F (c)) and J : R! R are differentiable at c and F (c) respectively
with J 0(F (c)) 6= 0, then F is differentiable at c.
Proof. Let f and g be differentiable lower support functions of F and G at c. For
(i)–(iii), we sandwich F between f and an appropriate differentiable upper support
function U and apply the Differentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma 1). Appropriate
upper support functions are (i) U(c) = H(c)   g(c), (ii) U(c) = H(c)/g(c), and
(iii) U(c) = H(c).
For (iv), F (c) = J 1(H(c)) is differentiable at c by the inverse function theorem
and the chain rule.
3.4 Theorem
The recipe from Section 2 applies generally. We now show that if an objective is
constructed out of endogenous functions using standard mathematical operations,
then those functions’ derivatives may be included in first-order conditions provided
that they have appropriate differentiable support functions. The notation here is
quite abstract, so we explain it using Example 2.
To establish this result, we must be more precise about what it means to con-
struct a function out of other functions. We define an envelope algebra as the set of
all functions that may be constructed from a set of (potentially endogenous) func-
tions. Our definition is recursive to accommodate the idea that once we construct
a function, we can use that function to construct other functions.
Let F(C) be the set of functions with domain C and co-domain R.
Definition 2. We say E  F(C) is an envelope algebra if:
(i) F +G 2 E for all F;G 2 E ,
(ii) FG 2 E for all F;G 2 E with F;G : C ! R++,
(iii) H(c) = maxG2G G(c) is in E for all G  E provided it is well-defined, and
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(iv) J F 2 E for all F 2 E and all differentiable J : R! R with J1 : R! R++.
Definition 3. The generated envelope algebra E(F) is the smallest envelope
algebra generated by F  F(C) that contains F .
In Example 2, F would be the negative of the two policy functions, f fA; fBg.
This negation is necessary, because we are formulating our abstract theory in
terms lower support functions of the endogenous functions. The generated envelope
algebra, E(F) is an infinite set that includes the leader’s objective function 1.
The following lemma establishes that if all of the endogenous functions F
have differentiable lower support functions at c, then so do all of the functions
constructed out of them. In particular, this means that the leader’s objective 1
has a differentiable lower support function.
Lemma 4. Let F  F(C) be a set of functions that have a differentiable lower
support function at c 2 int(C). Then every F 2 E(F) has a differentiable lower
support at c.
Now, we turn our attention to applying the Reverse Calculus Lemma (Lemma 3).
Our goal is to claim that the derivatives that appear in first-order conditions exist.
But which derivatives appear? To answer this question, we apply the algebraic rules
of calculus. We call functions whose derivatives appear in the (algebraic formula)
for the derivative of the objective active.
Definition 4. Fix any (E ; ; c) such that E is an envelope algebra,  2 E , and
c 2 C. We define the active envelope set A(E ; ; c) as the smallest set A  E
such that
(i)  2 A.
(ii) If F;G 2 E and F +G 2 A, then F;G 2 A.
(iii) If F;G 2 E and F;G : C ! R++ and FG 2 A, then F;G 2 A.
(iv) If F 2 G  E and H(c) = supG2G G(c) is in A and F (c) = H(c), then F 2 A.
(v) If J  F 2 A where J : R ! R is differentiable and J1 : R ! R++, then
F 2 A.
Finally, we can state our main result. Informally speaking, the theorem says the
following. Suppose an objective function  is constructed out of functions, all of
which have differentiable lower support functions. Then, at any interior optimal
choice, (i) all derivatives appearing in the first-order condition exist, and (ii) a
first-order condition holds. In Example 2, the theorem establishes that both policy
functions’ derivatives exist.
13
Theorem 1 (Envelope Theorem). Let F  F(C) be a set of functions that
have a differentiable lower support function at c^ 2 int(C). If  2 E(F) and
c^ 2 arg maxc2C (c), then (i) every function in the active function set A(E(F); ; c^)
is differentiable at c^, and (ii) 1(c^) = 0.
Proof. Since  2 E(F) and the envelope algebra E(F) is generated from functions
with differentiable lower support functions at c^, Lemma 4 implies that  has a
differentiable lower support function at c^. Since c^maximises , Lemma 2 establishes
that  has a differentiable upper support function at the maximum c^. Therefore,
 is sandwiched between two differentiable functions, so Lemma 1 implies that
it is differentiable at c^. Moreover, 0(c^) coincides with the derivative of its upper
support function, which is 0.
We prove by induction that every function in the active setA = A(E(F); ; c^) is
differentiable at c^. We set A1 = fg. To construct An+1, we examine each H 2 An.
For each part of Lemma 3, we select appropriate functions F and G from E(F), and
conclude that F is differentiable at c^. We do this for every possible combination
of F and G, and include each such F in An+1. We repeat this a countable number
of times, and observe that A = [1n=1An.
Theorem 1 establishes the method from Section 2 applies to a wide class of op-
timisation problems. While the general setting of the theorem is quite abstract,
the method itself is quite intuitive. In the next section, we explore more concrete
special cases of the theorem.
4 Corollaries and Related Literature
We apply our recipe to various classes of decision problems, and contrast our
results to previous literature. The main advances are that we can study all types
of endogenous functions (not just value functions), we accommodate non-smooth
problems involving discrete choices or boundaries, and we accommodate Inada
conditions that are often imposed to simplify first-order conditions.
4.1 Value Functions in Smooth Concave Problems
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) study value functions in smooth concave dy-
namic programming problems, but not policy functions. Their main theorem es-
tablishes that value functions in this setting are differentiable. The Differentiable
Sandwich Lemma leads to an elementary proof of their theorem.
Problem 1. Consider the following dynamic programming problem:
V (c) = sup
c02fc0:(c;c0)2 g
u(c; c0) + V (c0); (14)
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where the domain of V is C. We assume that (i)   is a convex subset of C  C,
(ii) u is concave, and (iii) u(; c0) and u(c; ) are differentiable, respectively.
Corollary 1 (Benveniste-Scheinkman Theorem). If c^0 is an optimal choice at state
c 2 int(fc : (c; c^0) 2  g), then V is differentiable at c with V1(c) = u1(c; c^0):
Proof. V is concave because u is concave and   is convex. Hence, the supporting
hyperplane theorem can be applied to the hypograph of V to construct a linear
upper support function U that touches V at c. We construct the differentiable lower
support function L(c) = u(c; c^0) + V (c^0). Lemma 1 delivers the conclusions.
Graduate economics textbooks such as Stokey and Lucas (1989) do not provide
a self-contained proof of this corollary. Our proof is short and elementary, and
therefore suitable for junior graduate students. The original proof is based on a
sandwich lemma, which Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) prove with the help of
Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.1). (Their lemma imposes a redundant assumption,
that the lower support function be concave.) Mirman and Zilcha (1975, Lemma 1)
prove a one-dimensional special case using Dini derivatives rather than sandwiches.
4.2 Value Functions in Non-Smooth Problems
Milgrom and Segal (2002) study the differentiability of value functions and ob-
jective functions without making any topological or convexity assumptions. Our
main contribution is that we also study policy functions. In addition, we present
two generalisations of their theorems. Our first generalisation accommodates In-
ada conditions, which are frequently employed to ensure first-order conditions ap-
ply. We then generalise further to accommodate stochastic dynamic programming
problems.
Their envelope theorems are the first to accommodate discrete choices. Specifi-
cally, they consider value functions of the form (c) = supd f(c; d), where ff(; d)gd2D
is an arbitrary collection of differentiable functions. Here, c and d represent con-
tinuous and discrete choices, such as a quantity and factory location choice. Their
Corollary 2 establishes that discrete choices only lead to downward kinks in ,
which decision makers would always avoid. Their result is a special case of the
following corollary:
Corollary 2. If (c^; d^) 2 arg max f then  is differentiable at c^ with 0(c^) =
f1(c^; d^) = 0.
Proof. The objective  is differentiably sandwiched between L(c) = f(c; d^) and
U(c) = f(c^; d^) at c^.
We illustrate this corollary with an example, before comparing Milgrom and Segal’s
work with our own.
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Example 4: Stackelberg with Factory Choice. Suppose the follower has
access to one of two factories, which have cost functions C1 and C2, respectively
(which are twice differentiable and strictly convex as usual). The follower’s overall
cost function is therefore C(y) = min fC1(y); C2(y)g : The follower’s profit function
has a downward kink at ~y2 where both factories are equally costly, as depicted in
Figure 6a.
y2
2
~y2
y1 = 1
y1 = 6
y1 = 9
(a) Follower’s profit, 2(y1; y2)
y1
y2
1 6 9y^1
~y2
(b) Follower’s policy, f(y1)
y1
1
1 6 9y^1
(c) Leader’s objective function,
1(y1) = 1(y1; f(y1))
Figure 6: Stackelberg when the follower has a discrete choice
Corollary 2 establishes that decision makers never choose kinks like ~y2, i.e. that
arise from discrete choices. This means that decision makers only choose points
where their objective is differentiable. However, this does not mean that the text-
book analysis of Stackelberg games generalises to this example. The follower’s pol-
icy function and leader’s value function, depicted in Figure 6b and Figure 6c, are
discontinuous. The leader’s first-order condition (4) does not hold at her optimal
choice, y^1.
Milgrom and Segal (2002, Corollary 2) is a special case of our Corollary 2.
Their version imposes redundant equidifferentiability and bounded derivative con-
ditions. These extra conditions ensure that directional derivatives of  exist glob-
ally, which their proof makes use of. Similarly, other papers make assumptions
including Lipschitz continuity,6 and supermodularity7 to ensure the existence of
directional derivatives. Our method does not require any such assumptions.
Both of their redundant conditions are problematic. The uniformly bounded
derivative condition conflicts with Inada conditions. Inada conditions are imposed
to ensure first-order conditions hold by directing optimal choices away from bound-
aries.
The equidifferentiability condition is problematic in dynamic problems, when a
discrete decision is taken in every period. The number of combinations of discrete
choices increases exponentially as the number of periods increases, which can lead
6Clarke (1975)
7Amir, Mirman and Perkins (1991)
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the number of kinks to grow rapidly. In other words, the kinks from tomorrow’s
value function propagate into today’s value function, as depicted in Figure 7a. In
infinite horizon problems, the set of combinations of discrete choices is (uncount-
ably) infinite. This can cause directional differentiability of value functions can
fail. For example, the “bouncing ball” function depicted in Figure 7b has no direc-
tional derivatives at c = 0, even though it is the upper envelope of functions with
uniformly bounded derivatives.8
a
~a
Vt
Vt 1
Vt 2
(a) Backward propagation of down-
ward kinks
V (c)
c
(b) The bouncing ball function has no
directional derivatives at c = 0
Figure 7
Our differentiable sandwich approach overcomes these obstacles, so we can
provide the first general envelope theorem for dynamic programming problems
involving discrete choices.
Problem 2. Consider the following stochastic dynamic programming problem:
V (c; d; ) = sup
c0;d0
u(c; c0; d; d0; ) + 
X
02
0V (c
0; d0; 0);
s.t. (c; c0; d; d0; ) 2  ;
where the domain of V is 
. We assume that u(; c0; d; d0; ) and u(c; ; d; d0; )
are differentiable.
Suppose that C(c; d; ) and D(c; d; ) are optimal choices at the state (c; d; ).
Definition 5. The set of feasible one-shot deviations from the optimal policies at
state (c; d; ) is
(c; d; ) =

c0 : (c; c0; d; d0; ) 2  ; and for all 0, (c0; c00(0); d0; d00(0); 0) 2  	 ;
where (c0; d0) = (C(c; d; ); D(c; d; )), and (c00(0); d0(0)) = (C(c0; d0; 0); D(c0; d0; 0)).
8 The bouncing ball function is the upper envelope of a set of parabolas, fv(; d)gd2D where
v(c; d) =   2jdj (c  d)(c  12d) and D = fs2 n : s 2 f 1; 1g ; n 2 Ng : On the relevant parts of the
domains, their derivatives lie in [ 1; 1].
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Corollary 3. Let (c^0; d^0) = (C(c; d; ); D(c; d; )) be optimal choices at state (c; d; ).
If c^0 is an interior choice, i.e. c^0 2 int((c; d; )), then (i) V (; d^0) is differentiable
at c^0 and (ii) c^0 satisfies the first-order condition
 uc0(c; c^0; d; d^0; ) = 
X
0
0 Vc(c^
0; d^0; 0) = 
X
0
0 uc(c^
0; c^00(0); d^0; d^00(0); 0);
where (c^00(0); d^0(0)) are shorthand for (C(c^0; d^0; 0); D(c^0; d^0; 0)).
Proof. We assumed that c^0 maximises
(c0) = u(c; c0; d; d^0; ) + 
X
02
0V (c
0; d^0; 0); (15)
where the domain of  is (c; d; ). The value function V has a differentiable lower
support function at (c^0; d^0; 0),
L(c0; c^0; d^0; 0) = u(c0; c^00(0); d0; d^00(0); 0) + 
X
002
000V (c^
00(0); d^00(0); 00): (16)
Therefore,  is sandwiched between a corresponding differentiable lower support
function, and a constant upper support function at c^0 By the Differentiable Sand-
wich Lemma,  is differentiable at c^0. By the addition rule of reverse calculus, V
is differentiable at each (c^0; d^0; 0).
4.3 Policy Functions in Smooth Concave Problems
Previous theorems about the differentiability of policy functions focus on smooth
deterministic concave settings. Our main contribution is that our recipe can be
applied without any of these conditions. For example, in our Stackelberg illus-
tration in Example 1, we accommodate boundaries and discontinuous marginal
utilities. In optimal stopping problems (such as the unsecured credit application
in Section 5.1), we accommodate discrete choices and shocks.
Araújo and Scheinkman (1977) study the differentiability of policy functions,
further restricting attention to deterministic one-good problems in which the utility
function is twice differentiable. Their proof is based on generalising the implicit
function theorem to infinite-dimensional spaces. Thus, their approach is similar to
our use of the implicit function theorem in Example 1. Reverse calculus is necessary
to extend this approach beyond one endogenous function.
Santos (1991) drops the one-good restriction, but retains the concavity and
twice-differentiability conditions. As mentioned above, he begins by noticing that
differentiability of policy functions is equivalent to twice-differentiability of value
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functions. He proceeds to construct a convergent sequence of quadratic approxima-
tions of the value function to establish this twice-differentiability. Like Araújo and
Scheinkman (1977), his results only address the differentiability of policy functions
and value functions. He does not accommodate qualitatively different endogenous
functions such as the cut-off policies in Section 5.1.
5 Applications
5.1 Unsecured Credit
Our first application is about unsecured debt contracts where borrowers may de-
cide to either repay in full or to default. We focus on markets without collateral
such as sovereign debt markets. The punishment for default is exclusion from the
credit market thereafter. Nevertheless, default occasionally occurs so interest paid
by the borrower must compensate for the default risk.9 For this reason, the in-
terest charged is non-linear and determined by a recursive relationship with the
borrower’s value function. If the interest rates are low, then the borrower’s value
of honouring debt contracts is high because rolling over debt is cheap. Conversely,
if the borrower’s value of repaying is high tomorrow, then the default risk today
is low. This recursive relationship determines interest rates as a function of loan
size and the credit limit.
The borrower’s decision problem is poorly behaved for two related reasons.
First, the discrete repayment choice leads to jumps in the marginal value of owing
debt. Second, following marginal changes in debt, these jumps lead to kinks in
the default risk and hence kinks in the interest rate. In other words, neither the
value function nor the budget constraint are globally differentiable. Nevertheless,
we apply our envelope theorem to establish that both endogenous functions – the
value function and the interest rate – are differentiable at optimal debt choices
(except for choices at the endogenous risk-free credit limit). Hence, first-order con-
ditions apply and we can establish an Euler equation involving a marginal interest
rate and a marginal continuation value. We then apply our envelope theorem to
characterise the borrower’s credit limit and reach our conclusion that the borrower
never exhausts his endogenous credit limit.
We build on the unsecured credit analysis by Arellano (2008) which is in the
tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Arellano carefully analyses it theoreti-
cally and numerically. She also sketches a Laffer curve for the debt choice, but
– without first-order conditions – does not characterise borrower behaviour along
it. The following three papers apply some Euler equations, with the first explic-
itly acknowledging that they lack justification for differentiating the interest rates
9 Default need not be inefficient compared to risk-free debt, as it implements risk-sharing.
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with respect to loan size. We provide a justification. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
dropped a detailed discussion of their heuristic (but now verified) Euler equation
from their nber working paper version. Similarly, we verify the heuristic Eu-
ler equations that Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) use to compare maturity
structures of loans. Finally, Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) discuss an Euler equa-
tion, implicitly assuming differentiability of interest rates. None of these papers
use first-order conditions to investigate credit limits, nor deduce our result that
borrowers never exhaust their credit limits.
Model. A risk-averse borrower has a differentiable utility function u and dis-
count factor  2 (0; 1). The borrower’s marginal value of consumption at zero is
infinite, i.e. limc!0+ u1(c) =1. Every period, the borrower receives an endowment
x which is independently and identically distributed with density f() on the sup-
port [xmin; xmax]. We assume the borrower’s endowment is bounded away from zero,
i.e. xmin > 0. To smooth out endowment shocks, the borrower may take out loans
from a lender with deep pockets. We focus our attention on debt contracts of the
following form. The borrower offers to pay a lender b0 in the following period, but
only promises to honour this debt obligation if the endowment tomorrow, x0, lies
in the set H 0. Thus, a debt contract consists of (b0; H 0), both of which are chosen
by the borrower. The lender is risk-neutral, discounts time at the same rate, and is
therefore willing to pay  R
H0 f(x
0) dx0b0 in return for the promise. If the borrower
defaults, he is excluded from credit markets thereafter. We also accommodate an
additional exogenous sanction of s  0 units of consumption every period for de-
faulting, which reflects the difficulty of settling non-financial transactions without
credit.10 The borrower’s autarky value after defaulting is
Waut(x) = u(x  s) + 
Z
[xmin;xmax]
Waut(x
0)f(x0)dx0: (17)
The lender only agrees to the contract (b0; H 0) if the borrower has an incentive
to honour the promise for the proposed endowmentsH 0. Specifically, the borrower’s
value of repaying b0 at an honour endowment x0 2 H 0, denoted Whon(b0; x0), should
not be less than the autarky value Waut(x). The borrower’s value of honouring
10 Exogenous sanctions are often included in unsecured credit models, so we include them
to show the generality of our technique. Without them, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that
exclusion from credit markets alone is an insufficient punishment for enforcing debt contracts if
the borrower can make private investments.
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debts is therefore11
Whon(b; x) = max
c;b0;H0
u(c) +
Z
[xmin;xmax]
max fWaut(x0);Whon(b0; x0)g f(x0)dx0;
s.t. c+ b = x+


Z
H0
f(x0) dx0

b0;
Whon(b
0; x0)  Waut(x0) for all x0 2 H 0,
b0  bponzi:
(18)
The last constraint rules out Ponzi schemes and the bponzi parameter may be arbi-
trarily large.
Reformulation. We reformulate this problem by making two simplifications.
First, Arellano (2008, Proposition 3) established that because x is iid, the honour
set H 0 chosen by the borrower is determined by a cut-off rule y() so that the bor-
rower honours his debt at state (b0; x0) if and only if x0  y(b0). In other words, the
borrower only ever chooses debt contracts of the form (b0; H 0) = (b0; [y(b0); xmax]),
so debt contracts are characterised by b0 alone. This means we may denote the
price of debt q(b0) as a function of b0. Second, we substitute the budget constraint
into the objective, so that the borrower’s only choice is his future debt obligation
b0. The reformulated problem becomes
Whon(b; x) = max
b0bponzi
u(x+ q(b0)b0   b) + W (b0); (19)
where
W (b0) =
Z
[xmin;xmax]
max fWaut(x0);Whon(b0; x0)g f(x0)dx0; (20a)
q(b0) = [1  F (y(b0))]; (20b)
y(b0) = min
 
x0 2 [xmin; xmax] : Whon(b0; x0)  Waut(x0)
	 [ fxmaxg : (20c)
We denote optimal policy functions by b^0(b; x).12
The objective (19) has two endogenous functions, q andW , which we will show
are not globally differentiable. The value function has downward kinks at states
of indifference between honouring and defaulting, as in the value function of the
indivisible labour choice illustration. Moreover, we have no a priori knowledge of
the differentiability of the debt price. We will construct differentiable lower support
functions for q andW and hence show that they both do not exhibit upward kinks
at any choice, with one exception: The debt price exhibits an upward kink at the
risk-free credit limit.
11 We mention some technicalities: (i) the borrower should be constrained to choosing a mea-
surable honour set, and (ii) the Bellman operator is well-defined for continuous value functions.
12 The borrower might be indifferent between several optimal policies.
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b0
x0
xmax
xmin
honour
b
y()
b0
default
(a) Borrowers default when x0 < y(b0)
b0
x0
honour
b b0
y(b0)
y(b0; b0)
default
(b) A “lazy” borrower undervalues honouring
debts, and defaults too much
Figure 8: The default cut-off rule
Differentiable Lower Support Functions. The problem of constructing a
differentiable lower support function for the debt price q() is equivalent to that
of constructing a differentiable upper support function for the cut-off rule y(),
illustrated in Figure 8a. For debts below some threshold b, the borrower always
honours his obligations, so the cut-off y() is constant and hence differentiable
on [ 1; b). At each debt level b0 > b, we now construct a differentiable upper
support function for y(). We consider a lazy borrower that – as a consequence of
his laziness – undervalues honouring debts, and hence uses a higher cut-off than
y(). Specifically we consider a lazy borrower who incorrectly anticipates the state
to be (b0; x0) = (b0; y(b0)), i.e. he anticipates his state will be on the cut-off. In
unanticipated states, he chooses his debt to be b^00(b0; y(b0)) independently of the
realized endowment x0. His consumption is adjusted by the differences from the
anticipated endowment and debt. This lazy borrower’s value function is
L(b0; x0; b0) = u(x0   b0 + q(b00)b00) + W (b00): (21)
Since the lazy borrower undervalues honouring debts, his honour cut-off y(; b0)
implicitly defined by
L(b0; y(b0; b0); b0) = Waut(y(b0; b0)) for all b0 (22)
provides an upper support function for the cut-off y() at b0, depicted in Figure 8b.
Since the lazy borrower’s value function is differentiable, the implicit function
theorem implies that y(; b0) is differentiable with y1(b0; b0) > 1 for all b0 > b.13
13 Apply the implicit function theorem on the lazy borrower’s value function to get
y1(b
0; b0) =
u1(c0(b0; y(b0)))
u1(c0(b0; y(b0)))  u1(x0   s)
> 1:
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Thus far, we have established that the slope of the cut-off y() is zero approach-
ing the risk-free limit b from the left, but greater than one approaching b from the
right. Therefore, the cut-off has a downward kink at b, so it has no differentiable
upper support function at this point. This means we have established:
Lemma 5. At every b0 6= b, there exists a differentiable upper support function
y(; b0) for y(), and hence a differentiable lower support function q(; b0) for q().
Moreover, y() has an downward kink at b with 0 = y0(b ) < 1 < y0(b+).
To construct a differentiable lower support function for W , we begin by construct-
ing a differentiable lower support function for Whon(b0; x0). However, this time, we
use a different lazy borrower’s value function from the one used to construct (21).
This time, the lazy borrower correctly anticipates x0, but incorrectly anticipates
b0 to be b0. He takes on a debt of b00(x0) = b^00(b0; x0) independently of his previous
obligation of b0. His value function is
M(b0; x0; b0) = u(x0   b0 + q(b00(x0))b00(x0)) + W (b00(x0)): (23)
This means that,
W (b0; b0) = Waut(x0) +
Z xmax
y(b0;b0)

M(b0; x0; b0) Waut(x0)

f(x0) dx0 (24)
is a lower support function for W at b0. We would like to establish that W (; b0) is
differentiable. First,M(; x0; b0) is continuously differentiable for all (x0;b0). Second,
we note that without loss of generality, we may assume some optimal policy b^00(; )
is measurable, and hence the resulting lazy policy b00() is also measurable.14 Third,
the measurability of the lazy policy implies that M1(b0; ; b0) is measurable for all
(b0;b0). Moreover, it is possible to show that M1(b0; ; b0) is uniformly bounded for
all b0 in some open neighbourhood of b0. Hence the Leibniz rule for differentiating
under the integral sign implies that W (; b0) is differentiable at b0 = b0 with15
W 1(b
0; b0) =
Z xmax
y(b0;b0)
M1(b
0; x0; b0)f(x0) dx0: (25)
This means we have established:
Lemma 6. At every b0, there exists a differentiable lower support function W(; b0)
for W .
14 See for example the Measurable Maximum Theorem in Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theo-
rem 18.19).
15 See for example Weizsäcker (2008, Theorem 4.6).
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First-Order Conditions. We can now return to the original problem (19). If
b^0 is an optimal debt choice at the state (b; x), then it maximises
(b0; b; x) = u(x  b+ q(b0)b0) + W (b0): (26)
Using q(; b0) and W (; b0), we can construct a differentiable lower support for this
objective at any b0. By the Differentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma 1), the bor-
rower’s objective is differentiable at the optimal debt choice b^0. Moreover, by re-
peatedly applying the Reverse Calculus Lemma (Lemma 3), we deduce that q and
W are differentiable at b^0. We conclude:
Corollary 4. Suppose b^0(; ) is an optimal policy function, fix any state (b; x), and
set b^0 = b^0(b; x). If b^0 6= b, then the following first-order condition holds and the
endogenous functions q and V that appear in it are differentiable at b^0:
u1(c^(b; x))(q(b^
0) + q1(b^0)b^0) = V1(b^0) = 
Z xmax
y(b^0)
u1(c^(b^
0; x0))f(x0) dx0; (27)
where c^(b; x) = x  b+ q(b^0(b; x))b^0(b; x).
The borrower equates the marginal benefit of owing debt with the marginal cost.
The marginal benefit consists of the marginal utility of consumption times the
marginal revenue from promising an extra unit to the lender. The marginal cost
consists of the expected marginal utility of the foregone consumption when repay-
ing the following period (when the endowment shock is above the default cut-off).
b0
q(b0)b0
bb
(a) Laffer curve for debt
q(b0)b0
1
q(b0)
q(b)bq(b)b
risk-free rate 1/
(b) Endogenous interest rate
Figure 9: Characterisation of endogenous borrowing
Credit Limits. We now turn our attention to the borrower’s behaviour near the
credit limit. The amount the lender is willing to pay, q(b0)b0 in return for a promise
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of b0 is not an increasing function. This is because there are two types of empty
promises: b0 = 0, and b0 so large it is never honoured. The borrower’s return on
promises therefore follows a Laffer curve, depicted in Figure 9a. The borrower’s
credit limit is the maximum of this curve, q(b)b, where
b = arg max
b0
q(b0)b0: (28)
If b > b, then we have already constructed a differentiable lower support function
for q, so the Differentiable Sandwich Lemma (Lemma 1) together with the Reverse
Calculus Lemma (Lemma 3) imply that q is differentiable at b with
q(b) + q1(b)b = 0: (29)
Substituting this into the Euler equation (27), we see that the marginal benefit
of taking on debt at b is zero, while the marginal cost is positive. Therefore, we
conclude
Corollary 5. For any given model primitives, either
(i) the overall and risk-free credit limits coincide, i.e. b = b, or
(ii) the overall credit limit is higher and exhausting it is suboptimal, i.e. b > b
and b^0(b; x) < b for all states (b; x).
This conclusion is a logical generalisation of behaviour in Aiyagari’s (1994) model.
Both here and there, the borrower reaches the risk-free credit limit with positive
probability. In the model we study, the overall credit limit is potentially higher,
as the borrower has the additional possibility of taking out risky loans. However,
behaviour near the two credit limits is strikingly different. Below the risk-free limit,
the interest rate 1/q(b0) remains constant as the loan size q(b0)b0 increases. Above
the risk-free limit, the interest rate increases as the borrower takes on more debt
and increases the default risk, as depicted in Figure 9b. This difference accounts
for why borrowers might exhaust their risk-free limit, but not their overall limit.
Arellano (2008, Figure 2) plots a similar Laffer curve as in Figure 9a. Possibly
for computational reasons, her curve is smooth and does not depict the upward
kink of the Laffer curve at the risk-free limit, b. She does not apply first-order
conditions along the Laffer curve.
Final Remarks. Despite our results regarding first-order conditions, credit lim-
its, and the Laffer curve, some questions remain. First, we do not know if the
Laffer curve is single-peaked. Second, the iid shock assumption was important for
Arellano (2008) to establish that the default policy is a cut-off rule. More generally,
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persistent shocks cause interest rates to depend on the shock in addition to the size
of the loan, which is crucial for understanding how credit markets operate when
borrowers are distressed. Nevertheless, we believe our analysis can be generalised.
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Ríos-Rull (2007, Theorem 3) established that
persistent shocks lead to two-sided cut-off rules. We conjecture that it is possible
to construct differentiable support functions for the two cut-offs, and use this to
construct a differentiable upper support function for the repayment probability.
Finally, we believe that first-order conditions will be central to exploring extensions
of the model to study issues such as partial default and optimal term structure.
5.2 Adjustment Costs
Firms are slow to adjust prices, labour forces, and capital stocks in reaction to
changes in market conditions. One explanation for this is that firms face adjust-
ment costs such as fixed costs or other non-convex costs. There is a large litera-
ture investigating how shocks propagate in the presence of adjustment costs and
whether or not adjustment costs amplify shocks; see the surveys by Khan and
Thomas (2008a), Leahy (2008), and Caplin and Leahy (2010). However, most of
this literature is purely empirical, because the theory of adjustment costs faces two
important obstacles. One is the complexity of optimal policy functions. Both theo-
retical and empirical analysis has only been tractable thus far when optimal polices
involve smooth cut-off rules for determining when adjustments take place.16 The
other is the difficulty in deriving recursive first-order conditions, as the value of
adjustment is not differentiable in general. Caballero and Engel (1999) use shocks
that enter linearly into the production function to smooth out the kinks in the
value function. Under this specific structure, they are able to take first-conditions
to characterise optimal adjustments. To make this operational, they conjecture
that adjustments follow a smooth two-sided (S, s) policy, but only verify this
numerically.17 Gertler and Leahy (2008) study a quadratic approximation of the
firm’s objective function in which the non-differentiable terms in the continuation
value of adjustment vanish and optimal policies are smooth two-sided (S, s). They
establish low error bounds for this approximation for an appropriate range of ad-
justment cost and shock parameters. Elsby and Michaels (2014) use first-order
conditions under the conjecture that the optimal adjustment policy is a smooth
two-sided (S, s) policy, also without providing sufficient conditions on primitives
for this conjecture to hold. For the purposes of illustration, Cooper and Halti-
16Specifically, we say that a policy is a smooth two-sided (S, s) policy if (i) for every capital
(or labour or price) level, the set of shocks for which the firm makes an adjustment is an interval
and (ii) the upper and lower end points of this interval are differentiable functions of the capital
level.
17 Caballero and Engel (1999, Footnote 16)
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wanger (2006, Section 3.2) and Khan and Thomas (2008b, Appendix B) provide
derivatives only in the absence of fixed costs; we show these derivatives hold gener-
ally. An alternative approach is to assume that information arrives gradually over
continuous time; see Harrison et al. (1983), Stokey (2008), and Golosov and Lucas
(2007).
The fundamental problem is that if a firm invests more today, then it might
defer subsequent investment longer. Thus a small change in today’s choice may
lead to a lumpy change in a later choice, giving a non-differentiable and non-
concave value of investment. We show that at optimal adjustment choices, the value
function is differentiable so that recursive first-order conditions are applicable. We
require only very weak assumptions on the primitives. In particular, our result
remains true even when optimal policies are not two-sided (S, s) (see for example
Bar-Ilan, 1990).
Model. In a general formulation, a firm is endowed with a capital stock k and
shock z. Shocks evolve according to a Markov process with conditional distribution
P (z0jz). In each period, the firm’s flow profit is (k; z); for example (k; z) =
pf(k; z)   rk where p is output price, f is the production function, and r is the
rental rate of capital. The firm pays an adjustment cost c(k0; k; z); non-adjustment
is costless. We assume the flow profit (; z) is differentiable for all z, and that the
adjustment cost c(; ; z) function is differentiable at all points (k; k0; z) such that
k0 6= k. For example, this accommodates the pure fixed-cost function, c(k0; k; z) =
I(k0 6= k). The firm’s value before adjusting its capital stock at state (k; z) is
V (k; z). Its value after adjusting its capital stock to k0 isW (k0; z). These two value
functions are related by the following two Bellman equations:
V (k; z) = max
k0
(k; z)  c(k0; k; z) + W (k0; z); (30a)
W (k0; z) =
Z
V (k0; z0) dP (z0jz): (30b)
Our goal is to establish the first-order condition for the capital choice k0
c1(k
0; k; z) = W1(k0; z) (31)
and to derive a formula for the marginal value of investment W1(k0; z) at the
optimal choice k0 = k^0(k; z). If there is a fixed cost of an adjustment, then this
formula will only be satisfied when the agent makes an adjustment, i.e. at shocks
z lying in the optimal adjustment set
A^(k) =
n
z : k^0(k; z) 6= k
o
: (32)
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Differentiable Lower Support Functions. We construct a differentiable lower
support function for the value function V by considering a lazy manager who knows
the optimal policy when he begins with a familiar capital stock of k = k. The ob-
vious lazy manager policy of sticking to the same capital choice when k 6= k is
not useful here, because it leads to a discontinuous lazy value function.18 Instead,
we consider a lazy manager who uses the familiar adjustment set and adjustment
level for unfamiliar capital stocks, i.e. he waits until he draws a shock z 2 A^(k)
and adjusts to k^0(k; z). Thereafter, his choices coincide with the rational manager.
His value function is
L(k; z; k) = (k; z) +
(

R
L(k; z0; k) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c(k^0(k; z); k; z) + W (k^0(k; z); z) if z 2 A^(k): (33)
It is straightforward to calculate the lazy manager’s marginal value of capital,
because the capital stock k does not affect any subsequent choices:19
L1(k; z; k) = 1(k; z) +
(

R
L1(k; z
0; k) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c2(k^0(k; z); k; z) if z 2 A^(k):
(34)
First-Order Conditions. If k^0 is an optimal choice at the state (k; z), then k^0
maximises
(k0; k; z) = (k; z)  c(k0; k; z) + W (k0; z): (35)
By substituting in (33) and (30b), we may construct a differentiable lower sup-
port function for (; k; z) at k^0. Lemma 2 provides a differentiable upper support
function, so Lemma 1 establishes the following corollary.
Corollary 6. If making an adjustment is optimal at state (k; z), i.e. z 2 A^(k),
then the investment value W is differentiable in capital at (k^0(k; z); z) and
c1(k^
0(k; z); k; z) = W1(k^0(k; z); z) = 
Z
~L1(k^
0(k; z0); z0) dP (z0jz); (36a)
where ~L1(k; z) = 1(k; z) +
(

R
~L1(k; z
0) dP (z0jz) if z 62 A^(k);
 c2(k^0(k; z); k; z) if z 2 A^(k):
(36b)
18 This obvious lazy manager makes an extra adjustment even if the capital stock is only
slightly different from the familiar level.
19 The lazy manager’s marginal value follows from the chain rule applied to (i) the expected
discounted profit as a function of all state-contingent capital choices, holding adjustment times
fixed, and (ii) the lazy capital choices as a function of initial capital k only.
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The first equation says that the marginal adjustment cost should equal the marginal
value of investment, which is the same for both rational and lazy managers. The
second equation says that the marginal value of increasing investment equals the
expected marginal increase in profit until the next adjustment plus the marginal
decrease in the subsequent adjustment cost. We have thus shown that first-order
conditions are generally valid even if the optimal adjustment policies are not (S,s).
In other words, we have established that the applicability of first-order conditions
is not an obstacle to the theoretical analysis of the implications of adjustment
costs to prices, labour forces, and capital stocks. The only remaining obstacle is
understanding when optimal policies are (S,s).
5.3 Social Insurance
Governments run public health, unemployment and disability insurance programs,
and private companies offer insurance contracts. These are constrained by frictions
such as hidden information, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Informal insur-
ance arises within well-connected families and communities when they can partially
overcome these frictions. There is a large literature studying informal insurance,
and the interaction of informal insurance with other forms of insurance.20 In the
dynamic insurance models of Thomas and Worrall (1988, 1990) and Kocherlakota
(1996), the main issue is how cross-subsidisation may be self-enforcing. Agents with
good luck subsidise those with bad luck in return for promises of future payments
and insurance. These papers study smooth convex environments in which the Ben-
veniste and Scheinkman (1979) theorem provides a formula for the marginal cost
of making promises.21 However, some important insurance problems involve non-
smooth settings. We focus on a setting similar to that of Morten (2013), which is
an extension of Ligon et al.’s (2002) model of self-enforcing dynamic insurance.
Villagers share risk among themselves by both sharing divisible output and sending
some members of the community to find temporary work in cities. The temporary
migration decisions are inherently discrete as they involve a fixed cost of moving
to the city and back. Other examples of indivisible items in village economies in-
clude livestock, medical treatments, agricultural land (due to high legal costs), and
houses. This environment is non-smooth and non-concave, so the marginal cost of
promises does not exist globally. Nevertheless, our envelope theorem applies and
allows us to characterise optimal insurance policies in terms of the marginal cost of
20 Apart from the papers we discuss, Townsend (1994), Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000), and
Krueger and Perri (2006) are important papers.
21 Kocherlakota (1996) mistakenly claims his value function is differentiable. Koeppl (2006)
amends his Bellman equation along the lines of Thomas and Worrall (1988). See also Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012, Chapter 20), and Rincón-Zapatero and Santos (2009, Section 4.2) for further
discussion.
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promises. Optimal policies involve sharing risk through allocating indivisible tem-
porary work obligations; divisible consumption is then allocated to smooth out the
marginal utility of consumption across states.
Model. Consider the following dynamic risk-sharing game between two house-
holds h 2 f1; 2g. Each period begins with a Markov shock s 2 S with transition
function p(s0js). The shock determines each household’s endowment of a divisible
consumption good, Ch(s). The aggregate endowment is C(s) = C1(s) + C2(s). In
addition, each household may produce M units of the consumption good from
temporary migrant work in a city. We write dh = 1 if the household migrates,
and dh = 0 otherwise. We assume that the utility from consumption u(; dh) is
differentiable, and that the marginal utility approaches infinity as consumption
approaches zero. The autarky value of each household is
V auth (s) = max
dh
u(Ch(s) +Mdh; dh) + 
X
s0
p(s0js)V auth (s0): (37)
Before investigating the social insurance arrangements with autarky constraints,
we present the social planner’s problem with Negishi weights 1 and 2:
W (s) =max
c1;d1
1u(c1; d1) + 2u(c2; d2) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)W (s0) (38a)
where c1(s) + c2(s) = C(S) + (d1 + d2)M: (38b)
The first-order condition with respect to c1 gives the Borch (1962) equation
u1(c1; d1)
u1(c2; d2)
=
2
1
: (39)
This means that after the social planner allocates the migration decisions, she
adjusts the consumption good until the planner’s marginal rate of substitution
between the households is equal to the ratio of Negishi weights at all states and
dates.
Now, we add in autarky constraints to study the optimal incentive-compatible
social insurance contract. The value function for household 1 can be formulated
recursively in terms of a principal-agent problem in which household 1 acts as
an insurer and is able to promise future utility to household 2. This promised
utility is a state variable, and has a corresponding promise-keeping constraint. Both
households can leave the contract at any time, so there is an autarky constraint
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for each of them.
V (s; v2) = max
c1;d1;d2;v02(s0)
u(c1; d1) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)V (s0; v02(s0))
s.t. (PK2) u(c2; d2) + 
X
s02S
p(s0js)v02(s0) = v2;
(A1-s0) V (s0; v02(s0))  V aut1 (s0) for all s0 2 S,
(A2-s0) v02(s0)  V aut2 (s0) for all s0 2 S,
(40)
where c2 = C(s) + (d1 + d2)M   c1:
First-Order Conditions. We now derive first-order conditions by applying
Corollary 3. For the purposes of applying the corollary, the discrete choice is the
migration allocation (d1; d2), and the continuous choices are the state-contingent
promised utilities v02(). The consumption choice c1 can be eliminated by substi-
tuting in the promise-keeping constraint. Corollary 3 delivers the following:
Corollary 7. Let (d^1(s; v2); d^2(s; v2); v^02(s0js; v2)) be an optimal choice at state
(s; v2). Fix some state (s; v2) and some future shock s0. If neither autarky constraint
binds for the choice of v^02(s0js; v2), then the value function V (s0; ) is differentiable
at v^02(s0js; v2) with
 u1(c^1(s; v2); d^1(s; v2))
u1(c^2(s; v2); d^2(s; v2))
= V2(s
0; v^02(s
0js; v2)) (41)
=  u1(c^1(s
0; v^02(s
0js; v2)); d^01(s0; v^02(s0js; v2)))
u1(c^2(s0; v^02(s0js; v2)); d^02(s0; v^02(s0js; v2)))
; (42)
where c^1(s; v2) and c^2(s; v2) are implicitly defined in terms of the other optimal
choices via the promising-keeping constraints.
This equation is the Borch (1962) equation which characterises perfect insurance –
the social planner’s marginal rate of substitution is equated across states and time
periods. This means we have shown that with both divisible and indivisible choices,
there is perfect insurance between households at all states and times for which the
autarky constraints are lax. When an autarky constraint binds, the Negishi weights
are adjusted and perfect insurance continues until an autarky constraint binds in
the future. This generalises the conclusion drawn by Thomas and Worrall (1988)
when indivisible choices are absent.
6 Conclusion
All envelope theorems have a sandwich idea at their core. Previous proofs were
structured around sandwiches of inequalities of directional derivatives. By restruc-
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turing around sandwiches of differentiable upper and lower support functions, we
gain two things. First, we do not require any of the strong technical conditions
from previous envelope theorems, and can accommodate primitives with Inada
conditions. Second and more importantly, our approach potentially applies to any
type of endogenous functions that might need to be differentiated in a first-order
condition.
Our method gains us a straightforward way of mixing and matching different
constructions of upper and lower halves of sandwiches. We used five constructions
throughout, namely (i) horizontal lines above maxima, (ii) supporting hyperplanes
above concave functions, (iii) reverse calculus, (iv) lazy value functions below ra-
tional value functions, and (v) lazy cut-off rules. Of these, only the reverse calculus
construction is truly unprecedented. The power of our approach derives from the
ability to combine these constructions. For example, the unsecured credit appli-
cation uses all but the supporting hyperplane construction. There are also other
possibilities that we did not explore. Decision makers can be “lazy” in ways that
lead to upper support functions, such as being lazily optimistic about future op-
portunities. In bargaining games, a lower support function for one player’s value
function leads to an upper support function for the other player’s value function.
To conclude, our new approach reveals that trade-offs which previously seemed
poorly behaved in fact have smooth structures within them that lead to first-order
characterisations of optimal decisions.
A Support Functions and Subdifferentials
The notion of a differentiable lower support function generalises the classic ideas
from convex analysis of supporting hyperplanes and subdifferentials. In this ap-
pendix, we establish a tight equivalence between differentiable lower support func-
tions and Fréchet subdifferentials. These were once seen as a promising way to
generalise the classical techniques of convex optimisation described by Rockafellar
(1970) beyond convex settings. However, according to Kruger (2003), these were
abandoned because of “rather poor calculus” as Fréchet subdifferentials do not
sum, i.e. @F (f + g)(x) 6= @Ff(x)+@Fg(x). In light of our developments, we believe
that Fréchet subdifferentials may have other applications to optimisation theory.
Suppose (X; kk) is a Banach space and C  X.
Definition 6. A function f : C ! R is Fréchet subdifferentiable at c if there
is some m 2 C such that
lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck  0: (43)
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Such an m is called a Fréchet subderivative of f at c, and the set of all subderiva-
tives is called the Fréchet subdifferential of f at c, denoted @Ff(c). Definitions for
Fréchet superdifferentiable, superderivatives, and superdifferentials are analogous.
Theorem 2. m is a Fréchet subderivative of f : C ! R at c if and only if f has
a differentiable lower support function L at c such that L1(c) = m.
Proof. If L is such a differentiable lower support function, then L1(c) = m, i.e.
lim
c!0
L(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck = 0: (44)
Since f(c+c)  L(c+c) for all c, it follows that
lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck  0 (45)
and hence m is a Fréchet subderivative of f at c.
Conversely, suppose that m is a subderivative of f at c. We claim that
L(c) = min ff(c); f(c) +m(c  c)g (46)
is a differentiable lower support function of f at c. By construction, L is a lower
support function. Moreover, the function U(c) = f(c)+m(c c) is a differentiable
upper support function of L at c; by the first part of the theorem, U1(c) = m
is a superderivative of L at c. On the other side, m is a subderivative of L at c
because
lim inf
c!0
L(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck
= min

0; lim inf
c!0
f(c+c)  f(c) mc
kck

(47)
 0:
Therefore, L is differentiable at c with L1(c) = m.
Lemma 1 then becomes a classic result.
Lemma 7. If m is a Fréchet subderivative of f : C ! R at c and M is a
superderivative of f at c, then f is differentiable at c with f 0(c) = m = M.
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B Further Reverse Calculus Rules
This appendix provides two further reverse calculus rules that were not used in
the paper, but might be useful for other problems. Specifically, the rules relate to
convex combinations and function composition.
The rule for convex combinations is complicated, because the forward calculus
step is not obvious. The following lemma incorporates both a forward and reverse
calculus result.
Lemma 8. Suppose E : C ! [0; 1], F : C ! R, and G : C ! R have differentiable
lower support functions e, f , and g respectively at c. Consider the function
H(c) = E(c)F (c) + (1  E(c))G(c):
If F (c) > G(c), then
(i) The function h(c) = e(c)f(c) + (1  e(c))g(c) is a differentiable (local) lower
support function for H at c.
(ii) If H is differentiable at c, then e, f , and g are also differentiable at c:
Proof. Consider the two functions,
h(c) = e(c)f(c) + (1  e(c))g(c)
~h(c) = E(c)f(c) + (1  E(c))g(c):
Since f(c) > g(c), we have that h(c)  ~h(c), and hence h(c)  H(c) in some open
neighbourhood of c. This establishes part (i).
For part (ii), we see that ~h is differentiably sandwiched between h and H at
c. By the Differentiable Sandwich Lemma, ~h are differentiable at c. This implies
E(c) = [~h(c)  g(c)]/[f(c)  g(c)] is also differentiable at c. Therefore, both terms
of H, namely E(c)F (c) and (1 E(c))G(c), have differentiable lower support func-
tions, E(c)f(c) and (1 E(c))g(c), respectively. Part (i) of Lemma 3 implies that
both terms are differentiable at c, and hence F and G are differentiable at c.
Finally, we consider function composition of two endogenous functions.
Lemma 9. If H(c) = J(K(c)) is differentiable at c, where
• J : R ! R has an inverse J 1 and a differentiable lower support function
j() at K(c),
• K : R ! R has an inverse K 1 and a differentiable lower support function
k() at c, and
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• j0(K(c)) 6= 0 and k0(c) 6= 0,
then J and K are differentiable at K(c) and c respectively.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that j0(K(c)) > 0.22 We now establish
that this implies j 1 is a differentiable upper support function for J 1. To see this,
we evaluate the inequality j(c)  J(c) at J 1(x) which gives
j(J 1(x))  J(J 1(x)) = x:
Applying j 1 to both sides gives J 1(x)  j 1(x):
We can express K() as a function of J and H as follows:
J 1(H(c)) = J 1(J(K(c))) = K(c):
This has a differentiable upper support function j 1(H(c)) at c. Thus K has dif-
ferentiable upper and lower support functions at c, and is therefore differentiable
by Lemma 1. Next, evaluating H(c) = J(K(c)) at c = K 1(x) gives
H(K 1(x)) = J(K(K 1(x))) = J(x);
so J is differentiable at K(c) by the chain rule and inverse function theorem.
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